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“Privacy is Dead. Get Over It. You can’t put the genie back in the
1
bottle.”
—Steve Rambam
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than ever before, our lives are visible to others, from
government agencies and security services to the owners
of the websites we surf and the stores where we shop.
They track us in public, in workplaces and online,
compiling our personal information in massive databases
and sorting us into categories of risk, value and
2
trustworthiness.
Shockingly, a significant portion of the information about us which
3
is visible to others is made visible by us.
4
Two hundred forty million Americans use the Internet. We
5
6
7
shop online, make online travel reservations, bank online, visit
8
9
government websites, use social media websites, and engage in a
myriad of other Internet transactions. In doing so, we reveal our
1. Robert L. Mitchell, The Grill: Privacy Is a Thing of the Past, Says Private Investigator,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 10, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com
/s/article/326821/The_Grill_Privacy_is_a_thing_of_the_past_says_private_investigator
?nlid=1&source=NLT_AM; Steve Rambam, Privacy Is Dead—Get Over It, GOOGLE VIDEOS
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-383709537384528624.
Steve Rambam is the controversial founder and CEO of Pallorium, Inc., a private
investigations firm, and owner of PallTech, an investigative database service with
more than 25 billion records on United States citizens and businesses. Mitchell,
supra.
2. Don Butler, Big Brother Is Watching, More Than Ever Before, THE VANCOUVER
SUN, Feb. 3, 2009, at F8; Don Butler, Are We Addicted to Being Watched?, OTTAWA
CITIZEN (Jan. 31, 2009), http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/observer
/story.html?id=ade6d795-4e7a-4ede-9fc1-f7bf929849c8.
3. One study reported that eighty-nine percent of Internet users have
voluntarily revealed personal information online. Carrie-Ann Skinner, Majority of
Web Users Share Personal Data Online, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 12, 2008, 12:00 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9112302/Majority_of_Web_users_shar
e_personal_data_online?taxonomyId=84&intsrc=kc_feat&taxonomyName=privacy.
4. Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users, INTERNET WORLD
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
5. Seventy-one percent of adult Internet users shop online. Generational Differences
in Online Activities, PEW INTERNET (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org
/Infographics/Generational-differences-in-online-activities.aspx.
6. Sixty-eight percent of adult Internet users make travel reservations online.
Id.
7. Fifty-five percent of adult Internet users bank online. Id.
8. Fifty-nine percent of adult Internet users visit government websites. Id.
9. Thirty-five percent of adult Internet users use social networking sites. Id.
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names, home addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, credit
card numbers, and a plethora of other “personally identifying
10
information.” We seemingly trust that the websites to whom we
give this information will handle the information responsibly and
refrain from disclosing the information in any way we do not
intend or that may do us harm. Yet those sites use our personally
identifying information to predict our behavior, to deliver
advertising based upon the interests and habits gleaned from that
11
information, and, ultimately, to generate revenue.
This article is intended to be a discussion of the legal aspects
12
of Internet privacy, the right and ability to control what
information one reveals about oneself over the Internet, who can
access that information, and how that information can be used. It
is not intended to be a discussion of Internet security, which is a
related topic but focuses on the way that information (including,
but not limited to, personally identifying information) is protected
against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and loss or
13
14
destruction. We presume, as many others have concluded, that
Internet privacy is important and trouble ourselves only with the
mechanism by which our Internet privacy may be enhanced.
10. Generally speaking, “personally identifying information” or “PII” is
information which can be used to identify an individual, such as that person’s
name, address, email address, credit card number, or Social Security number. See
generally Internet Privacy: Comparison of Federal Agency Practices with FTC’s Fair
Information Principles: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) [hereinafter Internet Privacy
Hearings] (statement of Linda D. Koontz, Director, Information Management
Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01113t.pdf (discussing a
federal study regarding the PII that different federal websites obtain).
11. See, e.g., Facebook Sponsored Stories: Letting Companies Use User Content to Advertise,
L.A.
TIMES
TECHNOLOGY
BLOG
(Jan.
25,
2011,
5:40
PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/01/facebook-sponsored-stories
-allow-companies-use-status-updates-places-check-ins-to-advertise.html (discussing a
new Facebook feature that will allow companies to take user content and turn it
into an advertisement).
12. “‘Information privacy’ is the term theorists use to discuss the privacy
implications of the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.”
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1413 n.118 (2001) (discussing privacy problems with
databases).
13. Internet Privacy Hearings, supra note 10, at 6.
14. See, e.g., Rachel K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble:
Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 439 (2000) (discussing the threats the Internet poses to personal
privacy and proposing a multi-faceted solution that includes both constitutional
and statutory remedies).
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Part II of this article describes the current federal regulatory
and statutory scheme devoted to Internet privacy and addresses the
15
legislative actions taken by a few states to address the issue. Part
III describes the Internet privacy standards articulated by a few
foreign nations—the European Union, United Kingdom, and
16
Canada. Part IV describes notable attempts to privately enforce
17
Internet privacy rights through litigation. Finally, Part V makes a
case for the enactment of omnibus federal Internet privacy
legislation, which leverages private enforcement to enhance the
18
Internet privacy of all U.S. citizens.
II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS
A. The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary
governing body tasked with the responsibility of protecting the
privacy of information gathered online. The FTC derives its
authority from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA), which broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
19
practices in the marketplace. Under the FTCA, the FTC has the
20
power to extend online data protection by rulemaking. However,
rather than promulgate privacy rules, the FTC largely subscribes to
21
a policy of “self-regulation” for most industry sectors. With the
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). Specifically, section 5(a) provides that “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared
unlawful.” Id. § 45(a)(1).
20. Id. § 57a(a) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe . . . rules which define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce (within the meaning of [section 45(a)(1) of this title] . . . .”).
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS i–ii (June
1998) [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports
/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (“The Commission has been involved in addressing online
privacy issues for almost as long as there has been an online marketplace and has
held a series of workshops and hearings on such issues. Throughout, the
Commission’s goal has been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation as
the preferred approach to protecting consumer privacy online.”); see also FED.
TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6
(July 1999) [hereinafter SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf (discussing the state of online
privacy self-regulation). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has consistently
stated that “self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure
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exception of financial services companies, health care providers,
and web businesses that target children, the FTC permits the vast
22
majority of businesses to establish their own privacy standards.
Accordingly, the FTC is only empowered to bring an enforcement
action against a company if it makes false representations in its
privacy policies that amount to “unfair or deceptive trade
23
practices.” As a result, the FTC is constrained in its power to
impact privacy protection in a meaningful way.
1.

A Historical Look at the FTC’s Approach to Internet Privacy

The FTC has endorsed two privacy models in the past fifteen
24
Starting in the mid-1990s, the FTC approached privacy
years.
policies, practices, and self-regulatory principles through the lens
25
of fair information practices. The FTC adopted, as the hallmarks
of its self-regulation standards, the core principles of fair
information practices, namely Notice, Choice, Access, and
26
Security.
Of the four principles, the FTC placed the greatest
emphasis on the principle of notice and successfully advocated for
27
privacy policies as an industry norm. During this time, the FTC,
fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and
computer technology.” Id.
22. CHARLES H. KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS PRIVACY LAW HANDBOOK 3 (2008)
(“[O]nline businesses in the United States are free to collect, use, and disclose
personal information in any way they choose, so long as those practices do not
violate commitments they have made to parties providing that information. Put
another way, American businesses generally are subject only to the online personal
information rules they impose on themselves.”).
23. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2114 (2004) (“[T]he agency is powerless—absent a specific statutory grant
of authority—to regulate the collection of personal data by companies that either
make no promises about their privacy practices or tell individuals that they will
engage in unrestricted use and transfer of their personal data.”).
24. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Proskauer
on Privacy 1 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches
/brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf.
25. Id.
26. PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 21, at 7; see also Internet Privacy Hearings, supra
note 10, at 2 (defining the four core principles: notice means that “[d]ata
collectors must disclose their information practices before collecting personal
information from consumers;” choice means that “[c]onsumers must be given
options with respect to whether and how personal information” is collected and
how it may be used; access means that “[c]onsumers should be able to view and
contest the accuracy and completeness of information collected about them;” and
security means “[d]ata collectors must take reasonable steps to ensure that
information collected from consumers is . . . secure from unauthorized use.”).
27. HAROLD F. TIPTON & MICKI KRAUSE, INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT
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the states, and consumer advocate groups appealed to Congress to
codify the fair information practices into law, but Congress refused
28
to enact any such federal omnibus scheme.
As the market progressed, the burden fell on the consumer to
29
navigate incomprehensible privacy policies. In response, the FTC
shifted its approach in the early part of the decade to a “harmbased” model designed to prevent tangible harm to consumers,
such as harm from security breaches and harmful uses of
30
information that cause economic injury.
The FTC targeted
identity theft, spam, spyware, and children’s privacy as its primary
31
As a result, the FTC focused its limited
privacy initiatives.
resources on security enforcement actions to address tangible
harms to consumers, rather than privacy enforcement actions. In
the past decade, the FTC has prosecuted twenty-five security
32
enforcement actions and only four privacy enforcement actions.
2.

The FTC’s Privacy Enforcement Actions

The FTC has broad discretion with regard to the enforcement
actions it brings, yet it is limited by its statutory authority and
33
financial resources. Ironically, as the FTC’s enforcement actions
HANDBOOK 2731 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that “almost all the top 100 commercial
sites now post privacy policies” (citation omitted)).
28. Brill, supra note 24, at 2.
29. David Vladeck, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Consumer Prot., The
Role of the FTC in Consumer Privacy Protection, Remarks Before the
International Association of Privacy Professionals 9 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck/091208iapp.pdf; see also Jon Leibowitz,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Concurring Statement Regarding FTC Staff
Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising 3 n.2 (Feb.
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadleibowitz.pdf
(“A study of the privacy policies of Fortune 500 companies found that they were
essentially incomprehensible for the majority of Internet users. Only one percent
of the privacy policies were understandable for those with a high school education
or less (like most teens and many consumers). Thirty percent of the privacy
policies required a post-graduate education to be fully understood.” (citing FELICIA
WILLIAMS, INTERNET PRIVACY POLICIES: A COMPOSITE INDEX FOR MEASURING
COMPLIANCE TO THE FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES 17, 18 tbl.2 (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf)).
30. Brill, supra note 24, at 2; Vladeck, supra note 29, at 3.
31. Brill, supra note 24, at 2.
32. See Privacy Initiatives, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy
/privacyinitiatives/promises_press.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (listing various
press releases detailing prosecution of security and privacy enforcement actions by
the FTC) (accessed by searching for the website at http://web.archive.org).
33. Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2041, 2056 (2000) (“[I]n principle, [the FTC] could bring enforcement
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demonstrate, a company that has a privacy policy is subject to an
FTC privacy enforcement action, whereas a company without a
34
policy would not be.
In 1998, the FTC brought its first Internet privacy enforcement
action against GeoCities, one of the most popular sites on the
35
Internet at the time.
The FTC alleged that GeoCities
misrepresented the purpose for which it was collecting personally
36
identifying information from children and adults. Through its
consumer registration process on its site, GeoCities created a
database with email and postal addresses, member interest areas,
37
income, education, gender, marital status, and occupation.
According to the FTC, GeoCities disclosed personally identifying
38
information to third-party advertisers for targeted advertising.
The enforcement action resulted in a settlement which, most
notably, required GeoCities to post on its site a clear and
prominent privacy notice that disclosed to consumers the type of
information it collected, the purpose of collecting that
information, to whom it would disclose that information, and how
consumers could access and remove their personal information.
GeoCities was also required to obtain parental consent before
39
collecting information from children twelve years old and under,
which was a prelude to the forthcoming Child Online Privacy
Protection Act.

actions against websites merely on the basis of ‘unfair’ practices.”). However,
Hetcher contends that the FTC is prevented from doing so for political and
practical reasons. Id. Practically, there are too many websites that are in violation
of the FTC’s fair information principles. Id. Politically, the approach in
Washington has been towards “governmental non-interference with the Internet.”
Id.
34. Id. at 2056–58 (“The Agency has never brought an enforcement action
against a website merely for ‘unfair’ trade practices.”). However, Hetcher
contends that once the website publishes a privacy policy, the FTC has jurisdiction
to bring an enforcement action. Id. (“Once websites make explicit statements on
their websites regarding their informational practices, they are then in a position
in which they must either live up to those promises or open themselves up to the
charge of engaging in deceptive trade practices.”).
35. Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal
Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 13,
1998), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/08/geocitie.shtm.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Similarly, in 2000, the FTC filed an enforcement action against
40
ReverseAuction, an online auction site competitive with eBay.
The FTC alleged that ReverseAuction registered with eBay and
agreed to eBay’s User Agreement and Privacy Policy to market and
41
promote its new site. ReverseAuction subsequently harvested eBay
users’ personally identifying information to send users unsolicited
messages promoting its own online auction site in an attempt to
42
divert users away from eBay.
As part of the settlement,
ReverseAuction was required to provide a privacy/notice policy on
its website, refrain from using personally identifying information of
eBay users who had not registered with ReverseAuction, and to
create a process for consumers to cancel registration and have their
personally identifying information deleted from ReverseAuction’s
43
database. In the wake of the settlement, the Chairman of the FTC
at the time stated:
Confidence that privacy will be protected is an important
element in consumers’ decisions where to shop on the
Internet. Self-regulatory efforts by e-businesses to protect
their customers’ privacy should be encouraged. But
beyond self-regulation, those who violate consumers’
privacy should be promptly called to task. Consumers
should have confidence that their privacy choices will be
44
protected.
Despite the FTC’s promises to improve Internet privacy protection,
it continued to prosecute Internet security cases at a higher rate
45
than privacy cases.
In 2004, the FTC brought an enforcement action against
Gateway Learning Corporation (Gateway), the company that
markets and sells the “Hooked on Phonics” brand, for making
40. Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 6,
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.shtm.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
The Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm.
The subsequent chairman similarly
announced plans to increase resources dedicated to privacy protection by fifty
percent. Id. (“We will enforce current laws vigorously, using more of the FTC’s
resources. We will stop those practices that are most harmful to consumers. We
will use our full arsenal of tools . . . to pursue our strong pro-privacy agenda
addressing real privacy concerns.”).
45. See Privacy Initiatives, supra note 32 (listing a greater number of security
cases than privacy cases).
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material changes to its privacy policy without notifying consumers.
The FTC contended that Gateway rented consumers’ personal
information to third-party advertisers, contrary to explicit promises
47
made in its initial privacy policy. The FTC alleged that Gateway
subsequently changed its privacy policy to allow for such disclosures
to third-party advertisers, but continued to rent information
collected under the initial policy without notifying consumers of
48
the change. The settlement provided, in part, that Gateway was
prohibited from sharing any personal information collected from
consumers under its initial privacy policy, unless it obtained
49
affirmative “opt-in” consent from consumers. The settlement also
required Gateway to relinquish the $4,608 it earned from renting
consumers’ information, which it paid to the Treasury rather than
50
to consumers. This case was the first FTC enforcement action
against a company for making material changes to its privacy policy
51
without notifying consumers, sending a signal to companies that
they are obligated to honor statements made in their privacy
52
policies.
However, some critics argue that the settlement was
indicative of the FTC’s weak enforcement ability, as evidenced by
53
the paltry fine and Gateway’s non-admission of liability.
In a similar case, the FTC brought an enforcement action
against a company for renting consumers’ personal information to
marketers in direct contravention to the privacy policies of the
46. Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jul. 7,
2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Bill Grabarek, Gateway Learning Settles Privacy Charges, DIRECT MAG. (Aug.
1,
2004),
http://directmag.com/mag/marketing_gateway_learning_settles.
According to Jessica Rich, an assistant director at the FTC at the time of the case,
“[t]his is the first FTC case to allege deceptive and unfair practices in connection
with a company’s material change to its privacy policy.” Id.
52. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02
/P085400behavadreport.pdf. This case became the basis for one of the four
governing principles of the FTC’s self-regulatory guide for behavioral marketing:
“before a company uses behavioral data in a manner that is materially different
from promises made when the company collected the data, it should obtain
affirmative express consent from the consumer.” Id.
53. Adam G. Todd, Painting a Moving Train: Adding “Postmodern” to the
Taxonomy of Law, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 139 (2008) (“The FTC’s rather weak
enforcement ability is illustrated by the consent decree that the FTC entered into
with Gateway . . . .”).
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54

merchants with whom the company partnered. The FTC brought
the case against Vision I Properties, LLC, doing business as
CartManager International, a company that provides shopping cart
55
software and related services to thousands of online merchants.
CartManager collected and rented the personal information,
including the name, address, phone number, email address, credit
card number, and buying information, of nearly one million
56
consumers who shopped at merchant sites. The FTC alleged that
CartManager failed to adequately inform consumers and
merchants that it collected and rented this information and that
such actions were contrary to many of the merchants’ privacy
57
policies. As a result of this case, companies and service providers
are now obligated to sync their individual privacy policies to avoid
58
liability for any discrepancies.
In a recent case, the FTC pursued an enforcement action
against ControlScan, a company that verifies the privacy security of
59
online retailers. ControlScan acted as an independent auditor of
merchant websites and placed seals on the sites to provide
consumers with an indication of the level of the sites’ security and
60
privacy controls.
The FTC charged that ControlScan misled
consumers about how often it monitored sites and the steps it took
61
to verify the sites’ security and privacy controls. The settlement
barred ControlScan from engaging in its certification practice and
ordered them to pay $750,000, which was reduced to $102,000 due
62
to the company’s inability to pay the larger sum.

54. Internet Service Provider Settles FTC Privacy Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.shtm.
55. Id. CartManager is the site that manages the “shopping cart” and “check
out” pages of online merchants. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Lydia Parnes, Acting Director of the FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection, as saying that “[c]ompanies and service providers must
make sure that their privacy policies are in sync . . . . A service provider cannot
secretly collect and rent consumers’ personal information, contrary to a
merchant’s privacy policy. At the same time, merchants have an obligation to
know what their service providers are doing with consumers’ personal
information”).
59. Online Privacy and Security Certification Service Settles FTC Charges, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/controlscan.shtm.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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The Future of the FTC’s Involvement

The FTC will continue to support industry self-regulation
rather than government-imposed regulation to keep pace with the
63
dynamic online marketplace. On December 1, 2010, after a series
of public roundtables and comment periods, the FTC issued a
64
report that details its new approach to privacy.
The report
attempts to balance the privacy interest of consumers while
65
encouraging industry innovation by addressing a number of key
issues:
•the collection and use of consumer information—both
online and offline—is ubiquitous, and far more extensive
than many consumers know.
•consumers lack the understanding and ability in
today’s environment to make truly informed choices about
the collection and use of their data.
•even in today’s environment of ubiquitous social
networking, privacy is important to consumers.
•the collection and use of consumer information
provides significant benefits [to consumers, including]
personalized advertising and other services, and,
importantly, it underwrites so much of the free content
available to consumers online.
•and . . . the distinction between [personally identifying
information (PII)] and non-PII is blurring.66
In response to these concerns, the report explores three selfregulatory proposals: privacy by design, transparency, and
67
consumer choice.
Despite the FTC’s continued affirmation of
63.
64.

See Brill, supra note 24, at 5.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
65. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Regarding the
Preliminary FTC Staff Privacy Report 1 (Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Leibowitz
Remarks],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz
/101201privacyreportremarks.pdf (“The FTC wants to help ensure . . . that the
growing, changing, thriving information marketplace is built on a framework that
promotes privacy, transparency, business innovation and consumer choice.”).
66. See Brill, supra note 24, at 3–4.
67. Id. at 4 (explaining that “privacy by design” means building security and
privacy “into commercial technologies and information practices from the
outset”). Brill also discussed the need for transparency through better privacy
policies “that are shorter, more comprehensible, and more consistent.” Id. Lastly,
Brill addressed the need for increased consumer choice through privacy notices
that focus on the “unexpected” use of consumer data and a “centralized ‘Do Not
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self-regulation to protect online privacy, it recognizes its
limitations, particularly in the areas of behavioral advertising and
68
teen privacy.
B. Federal Statutes
The United States lacks comprehensive national privacy
legislation.
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
are two of the primary federal statutes that provide remedies to
individual online consumers for privacy infringement.
1.

The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
69

Congress enacted COPPA in 1998 after the FTC reported
widespread abuse among operators of websites targeting children
70
in the collection and use of personally identifying information. In
the following year, the FTC issued its Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule (the Rule), which became effective on April 21,
71
2000. The FTC report that prompted Congress to enact the law
revealed that website operators were easily able to engage children
directly, without parental supervision, to obtain personal
72
information for marketing purposes.
The primary goal of COPPA is to give parents control over
what type of information is collected from their children online
73
and how that information may be used.
COPPA is significant
because it is the first federal law to impose substantial obligations
on website operators. The Rule applies to operators of commercial
Track’ mechanism that would give consumers some control over the extent to
which their online behavior is tracked.” Id. See also Leibowitz Remarks, supra note
65, at 6 (“The most practical method would likely involve the placement of a
persistent setting on the consumer’s browser, signaling the consumer’s choices
about whether or not to be tracked.”).
68. See Brill, supra note 24, at 6.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6508 (2006).
70. JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 14–36,
37 (4th ed. Supp. 2009).
71. 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–312.12 (2010).
72. WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 70, at 14–37 (“[A]ccording to the FTC data,
97 percent of parents whose children used the Internet believed that Web sites
should not sell or rent personal information relating to children, and 72 percent
objected to a Web site’s requesting a child’s name and address when the child
registers at the site, even if that information is only used internally.”).
73. Frequently Asked Questions About the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.shtm.
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websites and online services directed to children under thirteen
74
years of age that collect personal information, operators of
general audience sites that knowingly collect personal information
from children under thirteen years of age, and operators of general
audience sites that have a separate children’s area and that collects
75
personal information from children under thirteen years of age.
Operators covered by COPPA and the Rule must:
• post a privacy policy on the homepage of the website and
link to the privacy policy on every page where personal
76
information is collected;
• provide notice about the site’s information collection
77
78
practices to parents and obtain ”verifiable parental consent”
79
before collecting personal information from children;
• give parents a choice as to whether their child’s personal
80
information will be disclosed to third parties;
74. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (defining personal information as “individually
identifiable information about an individual collected online, including . . .(A) a
first and last name; (B) a home or other physical address including street name
and name of a city or town; (C) an e-mail address; (D) a telephone number; (E) a
Social Security number; (F) any other identifier that the Commission determines
permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual; or (G)
information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the website
collects online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this
paragraph”).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 6502; see also Children’s Online Privacy, BCP Business Center, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (providing legal resources that pertain to children’s online
privacy).
76. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a).
77. DONALD S. CLARK, SECRETARY, FED. TRADE COMM’N, CHILDREN’S ONLINE
PRIVACY
PROTECTION
RULE:
FINAL
RULE
AMENDMENT
9,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/050420coppafinalrule.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2011) (“The Rule . . . require[s] that operators make certain third-party
disclosures to the public [including] provid[ing] parents with notice of their
information practices.”).
78. 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b); see also CLARK, supra note 77, at 2 (explaining the
Rule’s requirement that operators make reasonable efforts in light of currently
available technology to ensure that the operator has achieved “verifiable”
consent). The FTC uses a sliding scale approach to determine what efforts are
reasonable to balance the costs imposed by the method of obtaining parental
consent and the risks associated with the intended uses of information. Id. at 2–6.
A less rigorous means of verifiable consent will be required if the information is
only to be used internally, while a more rigorous means will be required if the
information is disclosed to a third party. Id. The sliding scale provision was
originally set to expire on April 21, 2002, but was extended for an additional three
years. Id. In 2005, the sliding scale provision was extended indefinitely. Id.
79. 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).
80. See id. § 312.6 (a)(2).
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• provide parents access to their child’s personal information
and the opportunity to require the operator to delete the child’s
personal information and opt-out of future collection or use of
81
the information;
• not condition a child’s participation in a game, contest or
other activity on the child’s disclosing more personal
information than is reasonably necessary to participate in that
82
activity; and
• maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of
83
personal information collected from children.
The FTC is responsible for enforcement of the COPPA and
84
the Rule through section 5 of the FTCA. In 2000, the FTC filed its
first COPPA enforcement action when it amended a complaint in
85
an existing case against Toysmart.com (Toysmart). Through its
website, Toysmart collected detailed personal information,
including names, email addresses, and ages of children under
thirteen years of age without notifying parents or obtaining
86
parental consent.
The settlement of that complaint required
Toysmart to immediately delete or destroy all information collected
87
in violation of COPPA.
Since the Toysmart settlement, the FTC has pursued fifteen
88
additional cases asserting violations of COPPA. Historically, the
civil penalties range from $10,000 to $1 million in more recent
89
cases. Yet, critics argue that the FTC has failed to timely act on
90
complaints in recent years. Furthermore, COPPA has failed to
81. Id.
82. Id. § 312.3(d).
83. Id. § 312.3(e).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2006).
85. FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding
Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 21, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.shtm.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Legal Resources: Privacy and Security: Children’s Online Privacy, BCP
Business Center, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives
/childrens_enf.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
89. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Settles Charges Its Music Fan Websites Violated the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/12/sonymusic.shtm; Xanga.com to Pay $1 Million for
Violating Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7,
2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm (providing examples of
recent cases with $1 million civil penalties).
90. See An Examination of Children’s Privacy: New Technologies and the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
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keep pace with emerging social networking services and the
“extensive data collection of both the trivial and the intimate
91
information that children . . . share” over the Internet.
Most social network services, such as Facebook, MySpace, and
Twitter, prohibit participation by children that are thirteen years of
age or under, which makes them generally exempt from the
92
requirements of COPPA.
However, consumer rights advocates
argue that COPPA should be extended to cover adolescents
between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, because of their active
93
participation in social networking and digital media. Critics argue
that social networking sites are making it increasingly difficult to
navigate privacy policies and privacy settings, leading adolescent
94
consumers to reveal their personal information.
Furthermore,
adolescents are more likely to be impulsive than adults and may be
less likely to think about the consequences of disclosing personal
95
information.
Accordingly, consumer protection groups are
urging the FTC to consider expanding the application of the
96
Rule.

and Transp. and the S. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins., 111th Cong.
40–47 (2010) [hereinafter Children’s Privacy Hearing] (statement of Marc
Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66284/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66284.pdf (testifying about the
limitations of COPPA and the need to expand privacy protections). Rotenberg
claims that EPIC has filed complaints that have gone unanswered by the FTC, even
as other federal entities have deemed the offending companies to be in violation
of COPPA. Id.
91. Id. at 43.
92. See, e.g., id. at 43 n.14 (showing Facebook as an example of a social
network service that requires users to be at least thirteen years of age).
93. Id. at 45–46; Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 38–40 (statement
of Kathryn C. Montgomery, Ph.D., Professor, School of Communication,
American University).
94. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 42 (statement of Marc
Rotenberg) (testifying that EPIC raised this concern in a recently filed “friend of
the court” brief regarding the business practices of Facebook); Children’s Privacy
Hearing, supra note 90, at 39 (statement of Kathryn C. Montgomery) (“Social
networks have created privacy settings that create a false sense of security for teens.
While young people may believe they are protecting their privacy, they remain
totally unaware of the nature and extent of data collection, online profiling, and
behavioral advertising that are becoming routine in these online communities.”).
95. Brill, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that the consequences include identity
theft, adverse consequences for college applications or employment opportunities,
and can “open the door to bullies or predators”).
96. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 40–47 (statement of Mark
Rotenberg).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/12

16

Frieden et al.: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcem

2011]

PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE

1687

The flexibility of COPPA’s basic framework permits the FTC to
ensure that the law addresses new ways of collecting personal
97
information from children. Despite the FTC’s typical practice of
reviewing its regulatory rules every ten years, the FTC announced
to Congress on April 29, 2010, that it will accelerate the review of
the COPPA Rule to ensure that it adequately protects online
98
99
privacy for children. The public comment period and Review
and Roundtable have passed, but, as yet, there is no indication of
whether the FTC will act to revise the Rule.
2.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act

Subject to certain exceptions, the ECPA (more specifically, the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701) prohibits a person
100
or entity providing an “electronic communication service” from
“knowingly divulging[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a
101
communication while in electronic storage by that service.”
It
also prohibits a person or entity providing a “remote computing
102
service to the public” 0020from knowingly divulging the contents
103
As to both providers of electronic
of certain communications.
communication services and remote computing services, the statute
prohibits the knowing disclosure of “a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any
governmental entity,” but does not prohibit such disclosure to a
104
private entity.

97. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 5 (statement of Kathryn C.
Montgomery).
98. Children’s Privacy Hearing, supra note 90, at 12 (statement of Jessica Rich,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission).
99. See Public Comment(s) on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation of the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Through the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule (COPPA Rule), FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/os
/comments/copparulerev2010/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (compiling
a list of the comments received during the public comment period).
100. An “electronic communications service” is “any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
101. Id. § 2702(a)(1).
102. A “remote computing service” is “the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”
Id. § 2711.
103. Id. § 2702(a)(2).
104. Id. § 2702(a)(3).
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The statute provides for a private cause of action by persons
105
In such a case, the
“aggrieved by any violation” of the statute.
prevailing plaintiff may obtain “such preliminary and other
106
equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate,” an amount
equal to his or her actual damages and any profits made by the
defendant as a result of the violation of the ECPA, “but in no
case . . . less than the sum of $1,000” and plaintiff’s reasonable
107
attorney’s fees and costs.
3.

Pending Legislation

On May 4, 2010, former Representative Rick Boucher (D-Va.)
and Representative Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.) released a draft of privacy
legislation that would require greater disclosure of privacy practices
and consumer consent to collect and use certain kinds of personal
108
information. The proposed legislation requires greater notice to
consumers by obligating any company that collects personally
identifying information about individuals to conspicuously display a
clearly written, understandable privacy policy explaining how
109
information is collected, used, and disclosed.
The bill also
provides that most personally identifying information would be
subject to “opt-out” rules, meaning companies would be permitted
to collect information about individuals, unless the individual
110
affirmatively opts out of that collection.
However, the bill would require express “opt-in” consent to
knowingly collect sensitive information about an individual,
including information that relates to an individual’s medical
records, financial accounts, Social Security number, sexual
orientation, government-issued identifiers, and precise geographic
111
location information.
Companies would also be required to
obtain affirmative permission to disclose information to
105. Id. § 2707(a).
106. Id. § 2707(b)(1).
107. Id. §§ 2707(b)(3)–(c).
108. See Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Daniel Castro,
One Step Forward, Five Steps Back: An Analysis of the Draft Privacy Legislation, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND. (May 5, 2010), http://www.itif.org/files/2010-privacy-legislation.pdf
(analyzing the draft legislation).
109. H.R. 5777 § 101; see also Press Release, U.S. Congressman Cliff Stearns,
Stearns, Boucher Release Discussion Draft of Privacy Legislation (May 4,
2010),
http://stearns.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID
=183894 (providing an overview of the draft legislation).
110. H.R. 5777 § 103.
111. Id.
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unaffiliated third parties, such as advertising networks that collect
information about users, create profiles of the users, and target ads
112
to individual users based on their profile.
Under the bill, the
FTC would be the main enforcement agency and would be
113
required to adopt rules to implement the measure. States would
also be tasked with enforcing the FTC’s rules through state
114
attorneys general or state consumer protection agencies.
Nearly a decade has passed since Congress last considered
consumer privacy legislation, and as a result, the proposed bill
received a firestorm of criticism from both consumer groups and
115
the industry. Consumer groups criticize the bill for not going far
enough to protect consumer privacy, while at the same time going
too far in preempting state online privacy bills, including the state
116
bills that provide for private rights of action. On the other side of
the debate, industry groups criticize the bill for being overly broad,
arguing that the opt-in requirements inhibit the free-flow of
services and content that is currently provided to consumers largely
117
free of charge.
Rick Boucher was defeated in the November 2, 2010 elections,
118
which has led many to speculate on the future of the bill.
However, shortly after the election, Representative Joe Barton (RTex.), announced that privacy was a priority for the next
119
Congress.
Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.) also expressed
120
support for increased federal oversight of Internet privacy. Even
112. Id. § 104.
113. Id. § 602.
114. Id. § 603.
115. See Stephanie Clifford, Consumer Groups Say Proposed Privacy Bill Is Flawed,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/business/media
/05adco.html?_r=1.
116. See id; Andy Greenberg, New Web Ad Privacy Bill Riles All Sides,
FORBES.COM (May 4, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/04
/privacy-web-advertising-technology-bill.html.
117. See The Best Practices Act, and a Discussion Draft of Reps. Boucher and Stearns to
Require Notice to and Consent of an Individual Prior to the Collection and Disclosure of
Certain Personal Information Relating to that Individual: Hearing on H.R. 5777 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Energy and Commerce
Comm., 111th Cong. 7–8 (2010) (testimony of Michael Zaneis, Vice President of
Public Policy, Interactive Advertising Bureau), available at http://www.iab.net
/media/file/Zaneis_ConsumerProtectionSubcommittee.pdf.
118. See Cecilia Kang, Rep. Barton Pledges Push for Internet Privacy Oversight,
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/11
/rep_barton_pledges_push_for_in.html.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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if Boucher’s bill is ultimately dropped, some form of privacy
legislation is likely in the future given the bi-partisan support for
such comprehensive federal legislation.
C. State Statutes
1.

California
121

California is a key player in Internet privacy legislation.
California has passed two innovative laws that are the first of their
122
kind at the state and federal level.
While the California
legislation impacts online privacy for all consumers, even those
123
outside of California, the legislation insufficiently addresses some
124
of the major concerns highlighted by consumer interest groups.
The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA)
is the first of such ground-breaking statutes and requires
commercial websites and online service operators who collect
personally identifying information about California residents to
provide those residents with a conspicuous electronic notice of
125
posted privacy policies and to comply with those privacy promises.
Under the OPPA, privacy policies must contain certain
information, including the following: personally identifying
information collected, the categories of parties with whom this
personally identifying information may be shared, and the process
for notifying users of material changes to the applicable privacy
126
policy. Violation of this policy may result in civil penalties, private
127
suits, and even action by the FTC.

121. Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 88–89 (2007) (arguing for a new
federal privacy law).
122. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83
(West 2009); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 89 (discussing the California
Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) of 2003).
123. See Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 90, (“California law effectively acts as a
national regulation in the sense that its reach extends beyond California’s borders
to require any person or company in the United States (and conceivably the
world) that operates a Web site that collects [PII] from California consumers [to
comply with the California law].” (citation omitted)). It can be difficult to
distinguish between California consumers and consumers in other states, forcing
many online businesses to post privacy policies to avoid any possible violations.
124. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
125. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575.
126. Id.
127. Ciocchetti, supra note 121, at 90 n.154.
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While the OPPA notice requirement has broad-reaching
effects for website operators across the nation with regard to the
notice requirement, the legislation has caused little impact on
128
actual data collection practices.
OPPA’s privacy policy
129
requirement is ineffective for a number of reasons. Such policies
are often difficult for the average user to understand and users
rarely read them in practice because it would simply take too long
to actually read all the privacy policies applicable to users’ Internet
130
activities.
Furthermore, privacy policies falsely “lead consumers
131
to believe that their privacy is protected” when it may not be.
Finally, “there is not enough market differentiation” to inform
consumer choice and most users have difficulty weighing the costs
and benefits associated with sharing personally identifying
132
information.
Shortly after California enacted OPPA, the state legislature
passed another trailblazing Internet privacy law, the “Shine the
133
Light” law. Under “Shine the Light,” all non-financial businesses
(including online businesses) with twenty or more employees that
conduct business with California residents must disclose certain
134
information-sharing practices to their consumers.
According to
the law, businesses that have shared consumer information with
third parties for marketing purposes within the last twelve months
must provide instructions about how the consumer can make a
135
disclosure request. If a consumer makes a disclosure request, the
business must supply the consumer with information about the
disclosures made by the business, including the categories of
personal information disclosed to third parties and the list of
companies to which the consumer’s personal information was
136
disclosed for marketing purposes within the last calendar year. If
a business fails to respond to a disclosure request, the customer
may collect a civil penalty of up to $500 or a civil penalty of up to

128. UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF INFORMATION, KNOWPRIVACY 11 (June 1, 2009),
available at http://www.knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf.
129. Id. at 11–12.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 11–12.
133. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2009). The law went into effect on
January 1, 2005. See id. § 1798.83(i).
134. Id.
135. Id. §§ 1798.83(a), (b)(1).
136. Id. §§ 1798.83(a), (e)(6)(A).
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137

$3,000 for willful or intentional failures.
While the California law is one of the first attempts to address
“list brokerage,” which is “the compilation and sale of individuals’
personal information,” it also has limitations in protecting
138
consumer privacy.
First, the disclosure may be over-inclusive,
because the information in the disclosure does not have to be
139
specific to the consumer who made the request.
Companies
compile consumer information and “segment” that information
140
into customer lists. General disclosures of the segmented lists are
141
Second, the purpose of the law is to
permissible under the law.
provide information to consumers to assist them in making better
choices about the companies with which they decide to do
business. However, the law places the burden on consumers to
make disclosure requests and to decipher the information
142
obtained.
Third, the law is meant to shape consumer choice
going forward, but it does not challenge or rectify disclosures to
143
third-party advertisers that have already occurred.
2.

Connecticut

In 2008, the Connecticut legislature passed a privacy
protection statute that requires any person who collects Social
Security numbers in the course of business to create a privacy
144
The privacy policy must be published or
protection policy.
“publicly displayed,” which means Internet companies must post
145
their privacy policy on their web pages.
The policy must “(1)
[p]rotect the confidentiality of Social Security numbers, (2)
prohibit unlawful disclosure of Social Security numbers, and (3)
146
limit access to Social Security numbers.”

137. Id. § 1798.84.
138. California S.B. 27, “Shine the Light” Law, EPIC.ORG., http://epic.org
/privacy/profiling/sb27.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(a).
143. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (requiring disclosure only for
personal information that has been disclosed within the immediately preceding
calendar year).
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-471 (West 2010).
145. Id. § 42-471(b).
146. Id.
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While this statute codifies certain notice standards, it is
severely narrow in the information it protects and the businesses
147
affected.
Furthermore, any violation of the statute results in a
nominal civil penalty of $500 per violation to be deposited with the
148
state treasury. Such a remedy precludes a private right of action
for the individual consumer and places enforcement responsibility
on the Connecticut Attorney General. In 2009, Connecticut
considered a bill that would “set limits on companies that track
consumers across websites to deliver targeted advertisements based
149
on their behavior.”
However, the proposed legislation was
rejected in favor of the more narrow Social Security law.
3.

Minnesota

On March 1, 2003, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Internet
150
151
Privacy Law, the first state law of its kind in the country.
Minnesota’s privacy law prohibits Internet service providers (ISPs)
from disclosing certain personally identifying information
152
concerning their customers without customer authorization.
“The request for authorization must reasonably describe the types
of persons to whom personally identifiable information may be
153
disclosed and the anticipated uses of the information.”
A
consumer who prevails in an action brought under the law may be
entitled to a minimum of $500 or a maximum of the actual
154
damages incurred, as well as costs and attorney’s fees.
While
Minnesota is leading the way in privacy legislation of this kind, the
legislation is limited in its ability to protect consumers in a
meaningful way. Much like the ECPA, the Minnesota law only
regulates the information disclosure practices of ISPs, leaving
155
private website operators largely unfettered.
147. See id. §§ 42-471(b)–(c).
148. See id. § 42-471(e).
149. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 917 (2009)
(citing H.B. 5765, Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2008)) (examining privacy
statutes in the United States).
150. MINN. STAT. § 325M (2009).
151. Jordan M. Blanke, Minnesota Passes the Nation’s First Internet Privacy Law, 29
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 405, 407 (2003) (examining Minnesota’s internet
privacy law).
152. MINN. STAT. §§ 325M.02–.04.
153. Id. § 325M.04, subdiv. 2.
154. Id. § 325M.07.
155. See id. § 325M.09 (“This chapter applies to Internet service providers in
the provision of services to consumers in this state.”).
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Nebraska

In 2003, Nebraska amended its deceptive trade practices
statute to prohibit companies from knowingly making false or
156
While
misleading statements in their Internet privacy policies.
this provision may provide a cause of action against businesses that
fail to adhere to their Internet privacy policies, Nebraska law does
not mandate that every business adopt and implement such a
policy. In effect, this law may provide a disincentive for companies
to adopt a privacy policy because doing so may only subject them to
157
liability. However, Nebraska law does provide a general “right to
privacy” cause of action, which may provide protections against the
158
misuse of personal information on the Internet.
5.

Nevada

Nevada joins Massachusetts and California as one of the more
proactive and aggressive states in terms of its Internet privacy
regulations. In January 2010, Nevada enacted a new law requiring
all businesses to encrypt personally identifiable customer
information, including Social Security numbers, driver’s license
159
numbers, and credit card or other account numbers. Specifically,
160
transferring any
the law requires that any “data collector”
personal information through an electronic, non-voice
transmission (other than fax) to encrypt the information to ensure

156. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302(a)(14) (2007) (“A person engages in a
deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his or her business, vocation, or
occupation, he or she . . . [k]nowingly makes a false or misleading statement in a
privacy policy, published on the Internet or otherwise distributed or published,
regarding the use of personal information submitted by members of the public.”).
157. Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and
Tagging of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 616
(2008) (“[T]he . . . Nebraska laws only mandate that companies tell the truth in
their privacy policies—a practice that may only encourage companies to fail to
post a privacy policy rather than face the scrutiny of the state law.”).
158. See, e.g., Shlien v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Neb., 640 N.W.2d 643, 646–47
(Neb. 2002) (noting that a student brought a right to privacy action against a
university professor for wrongfully posting the student’s paper on the Internet
without authorization).
159. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 603A.010–.215 (LexisNexis 2010).
160. “Data collector” is defined under the statute as “any governmental agency,
institution of higher education, corporation, financial institution or retail operator
or any other type of business entity or association that, for any purpose, whether
by automated collection or otherwise, handles, collects, disseminates or otherwise
deals with nonpublic personal information.” Id. § 603A.030.
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161

its secure transmission.
A data collector is also prohibited from
moving “any data storage device containing personal information
beyond the logical or physical controls of the data collector . . .
unless the data collector uses encryption to ensure the security of
162
the information.”
Not only does this law regulate resident
businesses, but non-resident businesses with customers or
163
operations in Nevada are subject to the requirements as well.
The new law places additional constraints on website operators
collecting any “payment card” information in connection with the
sale of goods or services. Websites subject to this law must comply
with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI
164
DSS). Furthermore, Nevada’s comprehensive legislation includes
a data breach notification law, which requires a data collector to
disclose a security breach to the owner of the information if the
data collector determines that personal information has been
165
accessed by an unauthorized person.
Nevada also subjects ISPs to misdemeanor penalties for
unlawfully disclosing certain subscriber information, with the
exception of a subscriber’s email address, without the subscriber’s
166
informed, written consent. Although the statute does not require
a subscriber’s written consent for ISPs to disclose the subscriber’s
email address, the subscriber may opt-out by providing written

161. Id. § 603A.215(2)(a).
162. Id. § 603A.215(2)(b). Because of the broad statutory definition of
“storage device,” this provision impacts the use of laptops, iPhones, Blackberrys, or
any other electronic device capable of storing personal information. See Philip
Gordon, New Nevada Law Mandates Encryption of Sensitive HR Data, WORKPLACE
PRIVACY COUNSEL (June 15, 2009), http://privacyblog.littler.com/2009/06
/articles/data-security/new-nevada-law-mandates-encryption-of-sensitive-hr-data.
163. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.200(2)(a) (defining “business” as anyone
doing business in the state of Nevada); Ben Worthen, New Data Privacy Laws Set for
Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at B1.
164. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.215(1); see also Robert V. Connelly, Jr., Are Online
Privacy Policies Required by Law?, THE RVC BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.rendervisionsconsulting.com/blog/are-online-privacy-policies-required-by-law
(last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (analyzing federal and state laws to determine when
online privacy policies are required by law). “The PCI DSS is a multifaceted
security standard that includes requirements for security management, policies,
procedures, network architecture, software design and other critical protective
measures. This comprehensive standard is intended to help organizations
proactively protect customer account data.” PCI Security Standard Documents, PCI
SECURITY
STANDARDS
COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org
/security_standards/documents.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
165. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (LexisNexis 2010).
166. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498 (LexisNexis 2006).
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167

New York

Pursuant to New York’s Internet Security and Privacy Act, state
agencies are prohibited from disclosing or collecting any personal
168
information concerning a user through state agency websites.
The law also requires state agencies to provide users with access to
their personal information and the opportunity to correct or
169
amend such information. Moreover, the law requires the state to
create a model Internet privacy policy, which state agencies must
170
adopt and publish on their websites. Although these regulations
apply only to state agencies and not to private businesses or ISPs,
New York’s deceptive trade practices statute could be used to
171
require companies to comply with their Internet privacy policies.
7.

Pennsylvania

Like Nebraska, Pennsylvania law includes in its deceptive or
fraudulent business practices statute a provision prohibiting a
business from knowingly making “a false or misleading statement in
a privacy policy, published on the Internet . . . regarding the use of
172
personal information submitted by members of the public.”
However, without a law mandating that each business adopt a
privacy policy, Pennsylvania’s deceptive business practices statute
merely creates disincentive for risk-averse companies to publish
173
privacy statements and risk liability under those statements.

167. Id. § 205.498(1)(b); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 623 n.224 (“The
Nevada law also requires ISPs to provide a privacy notice to customers concerning
the requirements of this statute . . . .”).
168. N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2003).
169. Id. § 205.
170. Id. § 203.
171. See Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 617 (“New York’s deceptive practices and
false advertising statute has been used to require companies to honor their privacy
policy promises.”); see also Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339–40
(2001) (analyzing plaintiff’s deceptive practices claim against CVS for disclosing
plaintiff’s prescription information despite statements made on CVS’s website
expressing its commitment to keeping customer information confidential).
172. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107(a)(10) (West 2005).
173. See Ciocchetti, supra note 157, at 616 (noting that the Pennsylvania law
may only discourage companies from posting privacy policies to avoid scrutiny).
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In 2005, Pennsylvania enacted the Breach of Personal
174
The Act requires that any “entity
Information Notification Act.
that maintains, stores or manages computerized data that includes
personal information” provide notice to any resident of
Pennsylvania if the entity “reasonably believe[s]” that such personal
175
information has been accessed by an unauthorized person.
Pennsylvania joins the overwhelming majority of states who have
176
enacted similar data breach notification laws. While notification
statutes ensure that individuals can take the proper steps to remedy
a breach of their personal information, such statutes fall short of
providing a solution to prevent the security breach in the first
place.
Indeed, data breach notification laws have been
characterized as laws that “deal with what happens after the horse
177
leaves the barn.”
8.

Utah

In 2004, Utah passed the Government Internet Information
178
Privacy Act, aimed at regulating governmental entities’ websites.
The Act prohibits a governmental entity from collecting “personally
identifiable information” through its website unless the entity has
taken “reasonable steps to ensure” that the governmental website
179
contains a privacy policy.
The privacy policy must, inter alia,
disclose a summary of how the personally identifiable information
is used, the practices related to disclosure of such information, the
procedures by which a user may view and correct his or her
information, and “a general description of the security measures in
place to protect a user’s personally identifiable information from
174. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 2010).
175. Id. § 2303(a) (“An entity that maintains, stores or manages computerized
data that includes personal information shall provide notice of any breach of the
security of the system following discovery of the breach of the security of the
system to any resident of this Commonwealth whose unencrypted and unredacted
personal information was or is reasonably believed to have been accessed and
acquired by an unauthorized person.”).
176. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last updated Oct.
12, 2010). Only four states, Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and North Dakota,
have failed to enact similar laws. Id.
177. See Worthen, supra note 163 (citation omitted) (noting that researchers at
Carnegie Mellon University found that data breach notification laws only reduce
identity theft by about 2 percent).
178. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63D-2-101 to -2-104 (LexisNexis 2008).
179. Id. §§ 63D-2-103(1) to -2-103(2).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12

1698

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:4

180

unintended disclosure.”
Personally identifiable information
under the Act includes any information that identifies “a user by (i)
name; (ii) account number; (iii) physical address; (iv)email
address; (v) telephone number; (vi) Social Security number; (vii)
181
credit card information; or (viii) bank account information.”
In addition, Utah enacted the Notice of Intent to Sell
Nonpublic Personal Information Act, which requires all
commercial entities to disclose to customers the types of nonpublic
personal information that a business shares with or sells to a third
182
party for compensation.
“‘Nonpublic personal information’
includes: (i) a person’s Social Security number; (ii) information
used to determine a person’s credit worthiness including a
person’s: (A) income; or (B) employment history; (iii) the
purchasing patterns of a person; or (iv) the personal preferences of
183
a person.”
The law closely follows California’s law requiring
businesses to disclose to consumers any personal information the
business shares or sells to third parties for direct marketing
184
purposes.
Although not directly targeted at Internet businesses,
these two statutes directly affect Internet transactions, particularly
in light of the expansive growth of e-commerce.
9.

Virginia

In light of the Virginia legislature’s findings that an
“individual’s privacy is directly affected by the extensive collection,
maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information . . .
[and that t]he increasing use of computers and sophisticated
information technology has greatly magnified the harm that can
occur from these practices,” Virginia enacted the Government Data
185
The Act sets forth
Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.
several principles “to ensure safeguards for personal privacy,”
including a requirement that all information collected be used for
the appropriate and relevant purpose for which it has been
collected, mandating a “prescribed . . . procedure for an individual
to correct, erase or amend inaccurate, obsolete or irrelevant
180. Id. § 63D-2-103(2).
181. Id. § 63D-2-102(6)(a).
182. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -37-203 (LexisNexis 2009).
183. Id. § 13-37-102(5)(b).
184. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.83 (West 2009)).
185. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3800 to -3809 (West 2008).
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information[,]” and requiring agencies to take proper measures to
186
prevent the misuse of personal information.
The Act also provides for an expansive definition of “personal
information,” which includes any information relating to a person’s
“education, financial transactions, medical history, ancestry,
religion, political ideology, criminal or employment record,” or any
information which “affords a basis for inferring personal
characteristics, such as finger and voice prints, photographs, or
187
things done by or to such individual . . . .”
Furthermore, the
Virginia statute requires all public entities with an Internet website
to “develop an Internet privacy policy and an Internet privacy
policy statement that explains the policy” and conforms to the
188
principles of the Act.
10. Wisconsin
While Wisconsin has joined the forty-five states adopting data
189
breach notification laws, it has not, thus far, enacted any Internetspecific privacy laws. Although Wisconsin has created a Joint
Committee on Information Policy and Technology tasked with
reviewing “information management and technology systems,
plans, practices and policies” to ensure “data security and integrity,
[and] protection of the personal privacy of individuals who are
190
subjects of databases of state and local governmental agencies,” it
nevertheless trails states such as California and Nevada in its
Internet privacy legislation. Despite the lack of Internet-specific
privacy laws, Wisconsin has enacted expansive industry-specific
191
privacy legislation. Such laws cover financial information privacy,
192
government records privacy, and health information privacy.
Because these laws do not limit their application to personal
information stored in a particular medium, they could be utilized

186. Id. § 2.2-3800(C).
187. Id. § 2.2-3801.
188. Id. § 2.2-3803(B).
189. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2009) (requiring any Wisconsin
business entity maintaining or licensing personal information to make reasonable
efforts to provide notice to the subject of the personal information of any
unauthorized access of the subject’s personal information).
190. Id. § 13.58(5).
191. See Wisconsin Privacy Laws, OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROT., http://privacy.wi.gov
/laws/wisconsin/pdf/wisconsin_general_privacy.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2011)
(outlining industry-specific privacy laws under Wisconsin law).
192. Id.
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193

to protect certain aspects of Internet privacy.

III. COMPARABLE PROTECTIONS IN FOREIGN NATIONS
A. European Union
While the United States remains wedded to piecemeal
legislation and sectoral regulation of Internet privacy, other leaders
in the global community have responded to privacy concerns by
enacting omnibus privacy laws. At the forefront is the European
Union (EU), which adopted the EU Data Protection Directive on
194
October 24, 1995. Enacted as a comprehensive scheme to ensure
data protection across all sectors and communication mediums, the
Directive “instructs all Member States to enact laws that ‘protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of
195
personal data.’” It is this unambiguous declaration that the right
to privacy is fundamental which creates the divergence in privacy
policy between the United States and the EU. While the United
States has balked at an outright proclamation that the right to
privacy is fundamental and instead couches its privacy policies in
the form of patchwork judicial decisions and legislative mandates,
196
the EU has taken a more direct and comprehensive approach.
193. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 85.103 (allowing individuals applying for a
driver’s license or other identification card to request that the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation maintain the confidentiality of the applicant’s
personal information); Id. § 100.54(2) (enabling a consumer to put a “security
freeze” on his or her credit report to prevent a consumer reporting agency from
releasing his or her credit report); Id. § 943.201 (prohibiting the unauthorized use
of an individual’s personal information); Id. § 943.41(3) (prohibiting credit card
theft); Id. § 947.013(1v) (increasing the penalty for harassment if a person
committing the harassment intentionally gains access to a record in electronic
format that contains personally identifiable information regarding the victim).
194. Robert R. Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and Its
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 2784 (2002)
(noting that the European Union (EU) Data Privacy Directive went into effect
three years later on October 25, 1998).
195. Id.
196. See Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and
International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 668 (2002) (“The European
Union[’s] . . . Data Privacy Directive . . . created a global model of a rigorous
legislative approach to privacy . . . in contrast to the U.S. ‘mix of legislation,
regulation, and self-regulation.’”); Chuan Sun, Note, The European Union Privacy
Directive and Its Impact on the U.S. Privacy Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 99, 104–05 (2003) (discussing the fundamental
differences in EU and United States approaches to privacy policy).
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The EU’s Directive begins with two seemingly inapposite
objectives: (1) the protection of an individual’s right to privacy with
respect to personal data; and (2) enabling the free flow of personal
197
data.
To that end, the Directive requires that any entity
collecting personal information must do so for “specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes,” and must collect information that is
“adequate and relevant for the stated purpose, accurate and
current, and maintained in personal identifiable form for only the
amount of time needed to accomplish the stated purpose for
198
collection.”
The most unique feature however is the Directive’s “opt-in”
provision. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Directive, Member States
may process personal data if “the data subject has unambiguously
199
given his consent.”
This opt-in requirement stands in stark
contrast to the general policy adopted by the United States, which
permits the processing of personal data unless the individual opts
out. For example, in the United States, an individual must register
with the “do not call” registry in order to avoid telemarketers;
whereas, citizens of the EU must affirmatively consent to being
200
contacted by direct marketing services.
Thus, the United States
default favors the dissemination and access of personal data while
the EU’s default gives the owner of the information control over its
dissemination.
The Directive’s reach however does not merely implicate the
twenty-seven EU Member States. Article 25, one of the Directive’s
more controversial provisions, provides that Member States may
only transfer personal data to non-EU Member States if those non201
Member States provide “an adequate level of protection.”
This

197. Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L
281) Art. I (EC) [hereinafter EU Directive].
198. Jonathan P. Cody, Comment, Protecting Privacy over the Internet: Has the
Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1212–13 (1999)
(citation omitted) (studying Internet privacy regulations).
199. EU Directive, supra note 197, Sec. II, Art. 7. A Member State may also
process personal data in situations in which processing is necessary to comply with
legal orders or contracts or in other narrow exceptions. Id.
200. See Seagrumn Smith, Microsoft and the European Union Face Off Over Internet
Privacy Concerns, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, http://www.law.duke.edu
/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0014.html (“This opt-out versus opt-in debate
reflects a major philosophical difference in how the EU and U.S. regard personal
data privacy . . . .”).
201. EU Directive, supra note 197, Art. 25.
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far-reaching provision caught the attention of the Clinton
administration, which began negotiations with the EU to establish a
“Safe Harbor” framework that would ensure that the Directive did
202
not interrupt data flow from the EU to the United States. By July
2000, the U.S. Department of Commerce had successfully
negotiated the agreement through the EU, which voted to approve
the Safe Harbor principles despite objection from a majority of the
203
European Parliament. Although membership in the Safe Harbor
is voluntary, companies that do certify with the U.S. Department of
Commerce agree that they will comply with the Safe Harbor
204
principles. Participants in the Safe Harbor are assured that their
privacy protections will be “deemed adequate” and in compliance
with the Directive, thus ensuring that data flow from the EU to the
205
United States continues uninterrupted.
In an effort to supplement the EU Directive to address
concerns of an increasingly electronic global environment, the
European Commission (EC) adopted the Electronic Privacy
206
Directive (e-Privacy Directive) in 2002.
The e-Privacy Directive
retains the opt-in approach utilized by the original Directive by
allowing “the use of automatic calling machines, faxes, or e-mail for
purposes of direct marketing . . . only for those subscribers who
have given their prior consent. In other words, the EU has adopted
207
Furthermore, the e-Privacy
an opt-in approach to spam.”
Directive “prohibits companies from taking personal data from
websites or finding the location of satellite-linked mobile telephone

202. Salbu, supra note 196, at 678.
203. Id. at 679–80 (noting that the European Parliament was skeptical of the
Safe Harbor because it lacked an independent body capable of adjudicating
violations).
204. See Schriver, supra note 194, at 2790–91 (enumerating the Safe Harbor
principles, including the requirements that participating companies must give
individuals the choice as to whether their personal information will be disclosed to
third parties and that individuals must be given access to their personal
information and the ability to correct or delete any inaccurate information).
205. Id. at 2789–90.
206. Directive 2002/58, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 207)
(EC), amended by Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC).
207. George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuura, European E-Commerce Initiatives, in
LAW OF THE INTERNET § 13.11, at 13-128 (2010); see also Ariella Mutchler, Note,
CAN-SPAM Versus the European Union E-Privacy Directive: Does Either Provide a Solution
to the Problem of Spam?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 957, 972 (“[O]ne exception to the
opt-in rule allows e-mail solicitation when the marketer obtains the e-mail address
in the context of a sale of goods or services.”).
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208

users.”
In light of rapid advancements in technology and a generation
immersed in social networking, the EC recently announced its
intent to update the fifteen-year-old Directive, which will include
209
revisions to the e-Privacy Directive.
The EC’s overhaul will
include efforts to make it easier for individuals to access, correct,
and delete their personal information, and will implement a more
210
stringent enforcement regime for privacy violations.
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) enacted the Data Protection Act of
211
1998 to establish a framework to comply with the EU Directive.
The UK established the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
as an independent authority assigned to be directly responsible for
212
implementing the Data Protection Act. The principles of the Act
closely mirror those of the EU Directive, including requirements
for fair and lawful processing of personal data and protections
against electronic marketing messages (whether phone, fax, or
213
email).
Although the UK’s Internet privacy laws are facially compliant
with the EU Directive, the UK has been under intense scrutiny
recently for failing to enforce these privacy principles.
In
September 2010, the EC referred the UK to the European Court of
208. Delta & Matsuura, supra note 207, at 13-128.
209. Drew Singer, EU Calls for Stronger Internet Privacy Laws, JURIST (Nov. 4, 2010,
10:36 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/eu-calls-for-stronger-internetprivacy-laws.php.
210. EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2, (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf
(“[R]apid technological developments and globalisation have profoundly changed
the world around us, and brought new challenges for the protection of personal
data.”).
211. See INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, THE GUIDE TO DATA PROTECTION,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical
_application/THE_GUIDE_TO_DATA_PROTECTION.ashx.
212. Id. at 11–12.
213. Id. at 37–39; see also INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS (EU DIRECTIVE) REGULATIONS 2003: WHEN AND HOW TO
COMPLAIN ABOUT ELECTRONIC MARKETING MESSAGES, http://www.ico.gov.uk/~
/media/documents/library/Privacy_and_electronic/Introductory/PECR%20HO
W%20TO%20COMPLAIN%20FINAL.ashx (stating that the Privacy and Electronic
Communications Regulations of 2003 govern electronic marketing).
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Justice for failing to comply with the EU regulations protecting the
214
privacy of electronic communications. Specifically, the EC found
that UK privacy laws were not being properly implemented with
respect to “Phorm,” a system used by UK Internet service providers
to “monitor user web-surfing habits and deliver personalized
215
advertising without the user’s consent.”
The EC launched an
infringement proceeding in April 2009 to address the UK’s
deficiencies, citing lax standards with regard to obtaining an
individual’s consent to have their personal information
216
intercepted.
The EC requires that Member States have
“procedures in place to ensure ‘clear consent from the user that his
217
or her private data is being used.’” Although the UK put a halt to
“Phorm” after the EC’s infringement proceedings, the EC has
nonetheless initiated legal proceedings in the European Court of
218
Justice, calling for an overhaul of UK privacy laws.
C. Canada
Although Canada generally shares the United States’ affinity
for self-regulation with respect to privacy law, it nevertheless has
established its own omnibus regulation for the protection of
219
personal data. The Canadian Standards Association Model Code
for the Protection of Personal Information (Model Code) was
220
established in part to comply with the EU Directive.
The tenets
of the Model Code have now been incorporated into the Personal
214. Megan McKee, EU Suing UK over Internet Privacy, JURIST (Sept. 30, 2010, 3:23
PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/09/eu-suing-uk-over-internet-privacy.php;
Darren Waters, EC Starts Legal Action over Phorm, BBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7998009.stm.
215. McKee, supra note 214.
216. See Waters, supra note 214 (“At the heart of the legal action by the EC is
whether users have given their consent to have their data intercepted by the
advertising system.”); Telecoms: Commission Launches Case Against UK over Privacy and
Personal Data Protection, EUROPA (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://europa.eu
/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
217. Waters, supra note 214.
218. McKee, supra note 214 (“Specifically, current UK law does not provide for
an independent national authority to supervise the interception of some
communications, it allows for communications to be received without fulfilling the
EU definition of consent and it does not have a mechanism that ensures sanctions
for unlawful unintentional interception, as required by EU law.”).
219. Cody, supra note 198, at 1215–16.
220. Id. at 1216 (“[The Model Code] establishes ten practice principles that
must be adopted as a whole by those who wish to participate . . . .”).
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Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
221
Similar to the United States’ Safe Harbor,
(PIPEDA).
222
participation in the PIPEDA is voluntary. The PIPEDA standards
very closely mirror the EU Directive principles, requiring that
organizations collect, use, and disclose personal information by fair
and lawful means, only with an individual’s consent, and only for
223
limited purposes.
Individuals also have the right to access their
224
personal information and correct any inaccurate information.
PIPEDA also establishes recourse for individuals who believe their
rights under the Act have been violated by allowing those
225
individuals to file a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner.
Recently, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner conducted a
symposium on Internet Privacy Law in Canada, after which the
Privacy Commissioner released a review of PIPEDA, including
226
recommendations for updating and improving the Act.
While
the Privacy Commissioner found that “PIPEDA is working
reasonably well,” it made nine recommendations to address certain
227
deficiencies.
The recommendations included a call to improve
228
Noting that Canada was the only G-8
anti-spam legislation.
nation without specific anti-spam legislation, the Privacy
Commissioner warned that this deficiency was “undermining
confidence in the Internet and even prompting some people to

221. Principles in Summary: View Privacy Code, CSA, http://www.csa.ca/cm
/ca/en/privacy-code/publications/view-privacy-code/article/principles-insummary (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
222. See Introduction: View Privacy Code, CSA, http://www.csa.ca/cm/ca/en
/privacy-code/publications/view-privacy-code/article/introduction (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011) (“The [Privacy] Standards address[] two broad issues: the way
organizations collect, use, disclose, and protect personal information; and the
right of individuals to have access to personal information about themselves, and,
if necessary, to have the information corrected.”).
223. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., YOUR GUIDE TO PIPEDA, available
at http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/02_05_d_08_e.pdf.
224. Id.
225. See id. “[U]nder certain circumstances, [aggrieved individuals may also]
take [a] complaint to the Federal Court of Canada [if the Privacy Commissioner
failed to resolve the dispute.]”).
226. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Position at the Conclusion of the Hearings
on the Statutory Review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA), 8 PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP. 3, 4 (2007), available at
http://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2007/sub_070222_e.cfm (recommending changes to
PIPEDA).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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229

IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNET PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
THROUGH LITIGATION
A. DoubleClick
In 1999, Internet users brought a class action lawsuit against
DoubleClick, the market leader in online advertising, in one of the
230
first Internet privacy suits to be decided on the merits. The users
231
contended that DoubleClick placed “cookies” on users’ hard
drives each time the users visited any one of the 11,000 sites for
232
which DoubleClick provided targeted banner advertisements.
Plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick engaged in the intentional
unauthorized access of electronic communication in violation of
Title II of the ECPA when it tracked the communications between
the plaintiffs and the affiliated websites through use of the
233
The court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, holding that the
cookies.
use of cookies fell within the exception for “conduct authorized . . .
(2) by a user of that . . . service with respect to a communication of
234
or intended for that user.”
The court found that the affiliated
websites were “users” within the meaning of the exemption and
that as “users” the affiliated website consented to DoubleClick’s
235
access to the communications.
The court held that it was
indisputable that the affiliated websites had consented or
authorized DoubleClick to intercept communications, as evidenced
by the commercial relationship to generate revenue from
236
advertising.
Similarly, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for violation of
237
Plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick
the Federal Wiretap Act.
violated the act by intentionally “intercepting” electronic
229. Id.
230. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001.
231. The purpose of the cookies was to track users’ communications with
DoubleClick’s affiliated websites to create profiles of the users for targeted
advertising.
232. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03.
233. Id. at 510. “Communication” means the record of the particular pages
visited by the plaintiffs at affiliated websites and the information the plaintiffs
provide on those websites.
234. Id. at 507, 511; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2006).
235. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09.
236. See id. at 511–14.
237. Id. at 519.
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communications between plaintiffs and the affiliated websites.
However, the court held that DoubleClick fell within the statutory
exception for consent by one of the parties to the communication,
239
where the affiliated websites had consented to the “interception.”
The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) claim for failure to plead the statutory threshold
240
of $5,000 in damages for each individual class member.
The
plaintiffs claimed damages resulting from the aggregate loss of
their privacy, trespass to their personal property, and the
241
misappropriation of confidential data by DoubleClick. The court
held that damages may only be aggregated across victims for a
single act by the defendant, and that DoubleClick’s actions are
properly characterized as a series of single acts that individually
242
affected plaintiffs.
The court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims as a result of dismissing all of the federal
243
claims.
The parties ultimately resolved the case in a highly
244
publicized settlement prior to any appellate hearing.
B. Intuit
One of the first Internet privacy lawsuits brought in federal
court was a class action lawsuit filed in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California against Intuit, a
developer of financial and tax preparation software and operator of
245
In that case, plaintiffs
the website located at www.quicken.com.
246
alleged that a “cookie” was placed on their computers while
238. Id. at 515.
239. Id. at 514–16.
240. See id. at 520–26.
241. Id. at 523.
242. See id. at 524–26.
243. Id. at 526.
244. See DoubleClick Settles Online-Privacy Suits, Plans to Ensure Protections, Pay
Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B8.
245. In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
246. As the court noted,
[a] ‘cookie’ is an electronic file that online companies . . . implant upon
computer users’ hard drives when those users visit . . . Web sites such as
Quicken[.]com . . . . Cookies generally perform many convenient and
innocuous functions, such as keeping track of items Web site visitors may
purchase . . . . [Cookies may] keep track of usernames and passwords to
make it easier for people to access Web sites that require authentication .
...
Id.
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247

visiting www.quicken.com.
On this basis, plaintiffs alleged three
claims under federal statutes and two supplemental state law
248
claims. Intuit filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
249
upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiffs’ first claim alleged a violation of § 2701 of the ECPA,
which prohibits a person or entity from intentionally accessing
“without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided; or . . . intentionally
exceed[ing] an authorization to access that facility; and thereby
obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized access to a wire
or electronic communication while it is in electronic
250
storage . . . .”
Intuit argued that this claim should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that defendant was a “third
party to the communications at issue” and because the plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently plead that the defendant “accessed an
‘electronic communication while it [was] in electronic storage in’
251
The court denied the
an electronic communication system.”
motion as to the ECPA claim, holding that the statute does not
require a defendant to be a “third-party to the communications at
issue” and that the “fact that Plaintiffs have alleged that certain
electronic communications were intercepted in transit at one time
does not preclude it from also alleging that other electronic
communications were accessed while in electronic storage at
252
another time.”
However, the court granted the rest of Intuit’s
motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs failed to allege facts
253
sufficient to support the remaining claims.
C. Pharmatrak
In 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit considered a case brought against a number of
pharmaceutical companies which raised “important questions
about the scope of privacy protection afforded internet users under

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1273.
250. Id. at 1275.
251. Id. (footnote omitted). Apparently, Intuit abandoned an argument,
asserted in its notice of motion but not in its opening brief, that its computers
were not “communication service providers” under the statute. Id. at 1275 n.3.
252. Id. at 1275–77.
253. Id. at 1277–81.
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254

the [ECPA] . . . .” The pharmaceutical companies invited users to
visit their websites for information about their drugs and to obtain
255
rebates.
One company, Pharmatrak, sold a service to the
pharmaceutical companies that accessed information about the
users and collected certain information meant to permit the
pharmaceutical companies to perform intra-industry comparisons
256
of website traffic. Most of the pharmaceutical companies clearly
communicated that they did not want personal or identifying data
about their website users to be collected, and they received
assurance from Pharmatrak that such data would not be
257
However, some users’ personal and identifying data
collected.
was later found on Pharmatrak’s computers, leading the plaintiffs
258
to file suit.
The district court entered summary judgment for defendants
on the basis that Pharmatrak’s conduct was not an “interception”
but fell within an exception to the ECPA which permits a thirdparty to obtain the contents of an electronic communication where
259
one party to the communication consents.
The First Circuit
addressed the issue on appeal.
In reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision, the First
Circuit noted that the ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act “by
extending to data and electronic transmissions the same protection
260
already afforded to oral and wire communications.” To this end,
it provides a private right of action against a person who
261
“intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral,
262
or electronic communication . . . .” The court also held that the
ECPA’s definition of the “contents” of an electronic
communication
encompassed
the
personally
identifying
263
information at issue.
The First Circuit found that the district
254. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 12–13 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006)).
260. Id. at 18.
261. For the purposes of the statute, “intercept” is defined as “the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. §
2510(4).
262. Id. § 2511(1)(a).
263. Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18.
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court had erred by not placing upon the defendants the burden of
establishing the consent necessary to fall within the subject
264
exception to liability under the ECPA. Moreover, the court held
that Pharmatrak’s conduct constituted an “interception” within the
265
meaning of the statute.
D. Post-9/11 Airline Cases
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a
number of governmental agencies commissioned studies geared
toward improving security at airports, military bases, and other
266
installations.
To conduct these studies, the government sought
and obtained private information concerning airline passengers
267
from a number of airlines. Discovery of the airlines’ disclosure of
personal passenger information to governmental agencies
268
triggered a flurry of litigation.
1.

Northwest Airlines

Without notifying its customers, Northwest provided the
National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) with the
names, addresses, credit card numbers, identity of traveling
companions, and travel itineraries (including hotel reservation and
rental car information) of persons who had flown on Northwest
269
between July and December 2001.
Discovery of this disclosure
resulted in the filing of at least nine class action lawsuits—seven in
270
Minnesota and one each in Tennessee and North Dakota.

264. See id. at 19–20.
265. See id. at 22–23.
266. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004
WL 1278459, at *1 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004; Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (D.N.D. 2004).
267. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp.2d at 304; Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer,
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
268. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp.2d at 304; Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer,
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
269. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1; Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
270. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/12

40

Frieden et al.: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcem

2011]

PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE

a.

1711

Minnesota

In the Minnesota lawsuits, the plaintiffs alleged that
Northwest’s actions violated the ECPA, the Fair Credit Reporting
271
272
Act (FCRA), and Minnesota’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The plaintiffs also asserted certain common-law claims against
Northwest, including invasion of privacy, trespass to property,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of
273
express warranties.
The plaintiffs argued that the Northwest
website contained a privacy policy which stated that Northwest
would not share customers’ information except as necessary to
make customers’ travel arrangements and that Northwest’s
disclosure of passenger information to NASA constituted a
274
violation of that privacy policy.
In response to the Minnesota cases, Northwest filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to state any
275
claims upon which relief could be granted. Under then-existing
federal standards for pleading, the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota construed the allegations in the plaintiffs’
pleadings and made all reasonable inferences arising there from in
favor of the non-moving party and considered each claim brought
276
against Northwest.
The court dismissed each of the plaintiffs’
277
claims.
(1) ECPA Claim
With respect to their ECPA claim, the plaintiffs argued that
Northwest’s access to its own electronic communications service
was limited by its privacy policy and that the disclosure of passenger
information to NASA violated that policy and, therefore,
constituted unauthorized access to the “facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided” as prohibited by 18
278
Plaintiffs also argued that the disclosure
U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1).
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2702, which prohibits “a person or entity
providing an electronic communications service to the public . . .
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
MINN. STAT. § 325D.44 (2010).
Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
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[from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents
279
of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”
The court held that Northwest was not the provider of an
280
“electronic communication service” and, therefore, could not be
281
held liable for violating § 2702 of the ECPA. Moreover, the court
held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim pursuant to § 2701 of the
ECPA because that statute prohibited improper access to an
electronic communications service provider of the information
282
contained thereon, not improper disclosure of information.
(2) FCRA Claim
In alleging their FCRA claim, the plaintiffs contended that
Northwest or its electronic communications service provider was a
“consumer reporting agency” and that the disclosure of passenger
information to NASA constituted the furnishing of a “consumer
report” to a third-party without the subject consumer’s written
283
consent, which is prohibited by the FCRA.
In finding that
284
Northwest was not a “consumer reporting agency” and that the
passenger information disclosed to NASA was not a “consumer
285
report” under the FCRA, the court characterized the plaintiffs’
279. Id. (citation omitted).
280. Id. (“In fact, Northwest purchases its electronic communications service
from a third party, Worldspan.”).
281. Id.
282. Id. (“There is no dispute that Northwest obtained Plaintiffs’ personal
information properly, in the ordinary course of business. Plaintiffs’ complaint is
not with how Northwest obtained the information, but with how Northwest
subsequently used the information. Because § 2701 does not speak to the use of
the information, it does not apply and Plaintiffs’ claims under § 2701 fail as a
matter of law.”).
283. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) (2006).
284. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *3 (“‘[C]onsumer reporting agency’
[means] any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit
basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
285. Id. at *3 (“The term ‘consumer report’ means any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a
consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to
be used or collected in whole or in part for the purposes of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes;
or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.” (citation
omitted)).
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FCRA claim as requiring “not liberal application of the statute, but
286
wholesale disregard of the statute’s purposes and definitions.”
(3) Deceptive Trade Practices and Negligent
Misrepresentation Claims
Northwest successfully argued that plaintiffs’ claims under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and for negligent
misrepresentation were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b), which prohibits states from enacting or
287
enforcing any law “related to a price, route, or service of an air
288
In dismissing plaintiffs’ DTPA and negligent
carrier.”
misrepresentation claims, the district court noted that the
preemption doctrine “bars state-imposed regulation of air
289
carriers,” including the regulation which might be imposed by
290
state consumer protection laws.
(4) Trespass Claim
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff seeking to recover for trespass
must demonstrate that: (1) she owned or possessed property; (2)
that the defendant wrongfully took that property; and (3) that the
291
The court held
plaintiff was damaged by the wrongful taking.
that the passenger information disclosed to NASA was not the
property of the plaintiffs but of Northwest and, since Northwest
292
could not wrongfully take its own property, no trespass occurred.

286. Id.
287. The Supreme Court determined that a law or claim “relates to” a price,
route, or service of an air carrier where it has a “connection with or reference to”
the airline’s rates, routes, or services. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
288. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994).
289. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995).
290. Nw. Airlines, 2004 WL 1278459, at *4 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 227–28).
291. Id. (citing H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475,
481, 31 N.W.2d 270, 274 (1948)).
292. “It may be that the information Plaintiffs provided to Northwest was
Plaintiffs’ property. However, when that information was compiled and combined
with other information to form a passenger name record (PNR), the PNR itself
became Northwest’s property.” Id. at *4.
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(5) Intrusion upon Seclusion Claim
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff alleging intrusion upon
seclusion must demonstrate that the defendant “intentionally
intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion”
of the plaintiff or his “private affairs or concerns” and that such
293
intrusion “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
The court found that the plaintiffs voluntarily provided their
personal information to Northwest and had a low expectation of
294
privacy in that information.
Moreover, the court found that
Northwest disclosed the information only to a government agency,
as opposed to the public at large, with the intent of addressing
295
security concerns following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Accordingly, the disclosure would not be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and could not be the basis of a claim for
296
intrusion upon seclusion.
(6) Breach of Contract and Warranty Claims
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims were based
upon the privacy policy posted on Northwest’s website, which
indicated that when users of the website reserved or purchased
travel services Northwest would “provide only the relevant
information required by the car rental agency, hotel, or other
involved third party to ensure successful fulfillment of your travel
297
arrangements.”
Though the plaintiffs did not allege that they
actually read the privacy policy, they claimed to have “relied to
298
their detriment” on the policy.
The court held that Northwest’s privacy policy was not a
unilateral contract because it was not sufficiently definite and the
plaintiffs did not allege that they had actually read the policy
299
before providing their information to Northwest.
Instead, the
court suggested that the privacy statement posted to Northwest’s

293. Id. at *5 (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn.
1998)).
294. Id. (“Plaintiffs [did] not contend that they actually read the privacy policy
prior to providing Northwest with their personal information”).
295. Id. (“Northwest’s motives in disclosing the information cannot be
questioned”).
296. Id.
297. Id. at *5.
298. Id. at *6.
299. Id.
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website was merely an unenforceable statement of policy. Even if
the policy statement was “sufficiently definite” and had been read
by the plaintiffs before plaintiffs provided their information to
Northwest, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege any
301
contract damages arising from the alleged breach.
b.

North Dakota (Dyer v. Northwest Airlines)

The North Dakota action was originally filed in state court,
“alleg[ing] that Northwest’s unauthorized disclosure of customers’
personal information constituted a violation of the [ECPA], 18
302
U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1) and (a)(3), and a breach of contract.”
Northwest removed the claims to federal court and filed a motion
to transfer venue or to stay or dismiss the action, requesting “that
the action be transferred to Minnesota,” be stayed pending
resolution of the Minnesota actions, or “dismissed for failure to
303
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
The United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota reviewed the plaintiff’s claims under the standard for
considering motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, accepting as true all of the factual allegations set
forth in the complaint and construing the complaint in the light
304
most favorable to the plaintiff.
In his response to Northwest’s
motion, the plaintiff conceded that, as a matter of law, no claim
existed under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (which prohibits “a person or
entity providing . . . an electronic communication service . . . to the
public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the
contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that
305
service”). Thus, the court was left to consider only the plaintiff’s
claims for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (which prohibits a
provider of “electronic communication service or remote
computing service to the public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer
of such service. . . to any governmental entity”) and breach of

300. Id. The court noted that, under Minnesota law, “general statements of
policy are not contractual.” Id. (quoting Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616
N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn. 2000)).
301. Id.
302. Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (D.N.D. 2004).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1198.
305. Id. (citation omitted).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

45

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12

1716

contract.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
306

[Vol. 37:4

307

These claims were dismissed.
(1) ECPA Claim

Like the court in Northwest, the United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota held that Northwest was not the
308
The court
provider of an “electronic communication service.”
noted that “[i]n construing [the statutory definition of ‘electronic
communication service’], courts have distinguished those entities
that sell access to the internet from those that sell goods or services
on the internet” and that § 2702(a)(3) of the ECPA prescribed only
the conduct of the former, an ISP or a “telecommunications
309
compan[y] whose lines carry internet traffic.” Traditional online
merchants and service providers are not providers of an “electronic
310
communication service” under the ECPA.
(2) Breach of Contract Claim
Like the plaintiffs in Northwest, the plaintiffs in Dyer contended
that the privacy policy posted on the Northwest website constituted
a contract which was breached when Northwest disclosed passenger
311
The breach of contract claim asserted in
information to NASA.
Dyer suffered the same fate as its predecessor: the court dismissed
the claim on the grounds that the privacy policy was not a contract;
the plaintiffs failed to allege that they accessed, read, understood,
actually relied upon, or otherwise considered the privacy policy
312
before providing their information to Northwest;
and the
plaintiffs failed to allege actual damages arising from the alleged
313
breach of contract.

306. Id. at 1198–99 (citation omitted).
307. Id. at 1200.
308. Id. at 1199.
309. Id. at 1198–99.
310. Id. at 1199.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 1200. In this way, the complaint in Dyer was even more deficient
than the complaint in Northwest Airlines, which at least alleged that the plaintiffs
relied upon the privacy policy. See at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004). In re Nw. Airlines
Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June
6, 2004).
313. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d, at 1200.
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American Airlines

American Airlines faced a nationwide class action lawsuit after
authorizing the disclosure of passenger information to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) without first
314
obtaining the passengers’ consent.
Plaintiffs filed suit against
American, alleging that it had knowingly allowed unauthorized
access to passengers’ personal information and that its agent,
Airline Automation, Inc. (AAI), had intentionally accessed and
315
disclosed such information obtained from American’s facility.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged violations under the ECPA and state
law claims for breach of contract, trespass to property, invasion of
316
privacy, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices.
In
response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiffs’ complaint
317
failed to state a claim for relief.
Finding that plaintiffs’ claims
were preempted by federal law or failed to state a claim, the court
318
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims.
a.

ECPA Claim

Plaintiffs alleged that American’s agent, AAI, violated § 2701 of
the ECPA by accessing and disclosing plaintiffs’ personal
information from American’s facility housing passengers’ personal
319
information.
Section 2701 prohibits “unauthorized access to a
facility through which an electronic communication service is
320
The court summarily dismissed the ECPA claim
provided.”
against AAI because American had authorized AAI to transfer the
321
data, and therefore AAI’s access was not unauthorized. Similarly,
the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that AAI violated § 2701 by
exceeding its authorized access to American’s facilities because the
complaint relied only on the “theory of unauthorized disclosure of
322
information, not of access that exceeded what was authorized.”
314. See In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554–55
(N.D. Tex. 2005).
315. See id. at 555.
316. See id. at 554, 562.
317. See id. at 554.
318. Id. at 554.
319. See id. at 558.
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 559 (“Section 2701 does not proscribe unauthorized use or
disclosure of information obtained from authorized access to a facility.”).
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Plaintiffs’ claims against American for violation of § 2702 of
the ECPA met a similar fate. American attempted to avoid liability
under a statutory exception “which permits disclosure of electronic
communications ‘with the lawful consent of . . . an . . . intended
323
recipient of such communication.’”
Plaintiffs argued that
American’s consent was unlawful because it violated American’s
privacy policy, which was part of the contract of carriage with
324
passengers.
Noting that the ECPA § 2702 is “a criminal statute,
and the mere breach of a contract normally is not ‘unlawful’ in a
325
criminal sense,” the court found that plaintiffs failed to state a
326
claim against American under § 2702 of the ECPA.
b.

Breach of Contract Claim

Finding that plaintiffs’ breach of contract was not expressly or
327
impliedly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), the
court nevertheless found that plaintiffs’ claim failed as a matter of
law because plaintiffs alleged no damages as a result of the
328
breach. Although plaintiffs alleged “that they sustained injury as
a result of defendants’ deceptive practice and invasion of privacy,”
the court found that such damages failed to maintain a cause of
329
action for breach of contract.
c.

State Law Claims

Under the ADA, state law “claims are preempted if they ‘relate
330
Plaintiffs
to’ the prices, routes or services of an air carrier.”
asserted state laws claims for “trespass to property, invasion of
privacy, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment” in
connection with American’s disclosure of their personal
331
information. Finding that the personal information was obtained
323. Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
324. See id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 561 (“Even if American was contractually bound by its privacy policy
not to disclose passenger information and can be held liable for breach of
contract, this obligation did not deprive it of the legal capacity under § 2702(b)(3)
to consent to disclosure.”).
327. See id. at 565–66.
328. Id. at 567.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 561–62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lyn-Lea Travel
Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 287 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002)).
331. Id. at 562.
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in connection with American’s “services,” the court held that the
ADA preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims “because they have a
connection at least with American’s ticketing service, including the
332
reservation component.”
3.

JetBlue

JetBlue faced a similar class action brought by passengers
whose personal information was transferred to a government
contractor in connection with a Department of Defense (DOD)
study regarding airline security in the wake of September 11,
333
2001.
Specifically, the DOD contractor, Torch Concepts, Inc.
334
(Torch), sought JetBlue’s “Passenger Name Records” in order to
create “a customer profiling scheme designed to identify high-risk
335
passengers among those traveling on JetBlue.” After enlisting the
help of the Department of Transportation and TSA, Torch
successfully convinced JetBlue to hand over its passenger
information, even though the transfer of such information violated
336
the airline’s own privacy policy.
Plaintiffs, passengers whose personal information was disclosed
to Torch, brought a class action against JetBlue, Torch, and others,
alleging violations of the ECPA, New York General Business Law,
337
breach of contract, trespass to property, and unjust enrichment.
Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that
338
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for relief. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed,

332. Id. at 564 (“Congress surely intended to immunize airlines from a host of
potentially-varying state laws and state-law causes of action that could effectively
dictate how they manage personal information collected from customers to
facilitate the ticketing and reservation functions that are integral to the operation
of a commercial airline.”).
333. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
334. Id. at 304.
335. Id. at 305.
336. Id. at 305. The passenger information disclosed by JetBlue included
“each passenger’s name, address, gender, home ownership or rental status,
economic status, social security number, occupation, and the number of adults
and children in the passenger’s family as well as the number of vehicles owned or
leased.” Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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339

dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.
a.

ECPA Claim

With respect to their ECPA claim, plaintiffs alleged that
JetBlue’s unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffs’ personal
information violated § 2702(a), prohibiting an electronic
communication service from divulging the content of any
340
communication maintained in electronic storage by that service.
Plaintiffs’ claim hinged on whether JetBlue’s Passenger Reservation
Systems, the website maintained by JetBlue to facilitate passenger
reservations, constituted an “electronic communication service”
341
within the meaning of the ECPA.
Similar to the Northwest cases, the court found that JetBlue
did not provide an electronic communication service, and was
“more appropriately characterized as a provider of air travel
342
services and a consumer of electronic communication services.”
In dismissing plaintiffs’ ECPA claim, the court noted that the
operation of its website did “not transform JetBlue into a provider
of internet access, just as the use of a telephone to accept
telephone reservations does not transform the company into a
343
provider of telephone service.”
b.

Violation of New York General Business Law

Plaintiffs’ second argument was premised on the theory that by
disclosing passenger information in direct violation of its own
privacy policy, JetBlue engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in
violation of New York General Business Law and other consumer
344
Defendants successfully argued that the
protection statutes.

339. Id. at 330.
340. Id. at 306 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1986)).
341. Id. at 306–07 (defining “electronic communication service” under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) as “any service which provides to
users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications” (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2510(15) (1986)).
342. Id. at 307–10. The court also found that JetBlue was not a “remote
computing service” as defined under the ECPA and dismissed plaintiffs’ claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1986). Id. at 310.
343. Id. at 307 (“Thus, a company such as JetBlue does not become an
‘electronic communication service’ provider simply because it maintains a website
that allows for the transmission of electronic communications between itself and
its customers.”).
344. Id. at 315.
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claim was preempted by federal law under the Airline Deregulation
345
Act of 1978 because the adjudication of such a claim would
directly impact the manner in which JetBlue communicated with its
customers concerning reservations and ticket sales—conduct states
346
are prohibited from engaging in under the ADA.
c.

Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiffs based their breach of contract claim upon the theory
that JetBlue’s privacy policy formed a contract between the airline
and its passengers not to disclose their personal information, and
347
Although
that by doing so, JetBlue breached that contract.
failing to persuade the court that the privacy policy was not a
contract between the two parties but rather a “stand-alone privacy
statement,” JetBlue successfully dismissed the breach of contract
claim on the ground that plaintiffs failed to allege damages
348
resulting from the breach.
The court found that plaintiffs’ only
alleged damage, “loss of privacy,” was not traditionally recognized
349
in a breach of contract action.
Without demonstrating some
economic loss as a result of the breach, plaintiffs’ breach of
350
contract claim was summarily dismissed.
d.

Trespass to Property

More accurately characterizing this claim as trespass to
chattels, the court again was not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument
that, by participating in the data transfer, defendants intentionally
351
interfered with plaintiffs’ personal property. Critical to plaintiffs’
claim was proving that the personal information transferred to
352
Torch was in fact in the plaintiffs’ possession.
Plaintiffs argued

345. 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006).
346. JetBlue, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 315–16 (applying the three-part Rombom test to
determine preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)).
347. Id. at 324–25.
348. Id. at 325–26.
349. Id. at 326.
350. Id. at 327 (“[Plaintiffs] had no reason to expect that they would be
compensated for the ‘value’ of their personal information”).
351. Id. (“To state a claim for trespass to chattels under New York law,
plaintiffs must establish that defendants ‘intentionally, and without justification or
consent, physically interfered with the use and enjoyment of personal property in
[plaintiffs’] possession,’ and that plaintiffs were thereby harmed.” (quoting Sch. of
Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (2003))).
352. Id. at 327–29.
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that JetBlue’s privacy policy, limiting the airline’s ability to transfer
passenger information to third parties, granted them a possessory
interest in the information because it could not be transferred
353
without their consent.
While the court remained skeptical of
plaintiffs’ argument, it declined to decide the issue, instead
dismissing the trespass claim because plaintiffs failed to establish
354
actual injury as a result of the trespass.
Noting that the only
injury alleged by plaintiffs was harm to their privacy interests, the
court found that “such a harm [did] not amount to a diminishment
of the quality or value of a materially valuable interest in their
355
personal information.”
e.

Unjust Enrichment

Similarly, the court found plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment
argument equally unconvincing. Alleging that JetBlue “received
some form of remuneration from Torch or another party as a result
of its disclosure of information,” plaintiffs argued that the receipt
356
of such compensation constituted unjust enrichment. According
to the airline, however, the only compensation it received as a
result of the disclosure was “the potential for increased safety on its
flights and the potential to prevent the use of commercial airlines
357
as weapons that target military bases.”
The court agreed with
JetBlue, finding that the only benefit it received was indeed
altruistic and dismissed plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim as a
358
result.
V. NEW LEGISLATION SHOULD LEVERAGE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
In an attempt to fill the void left by its failure to enact omnibus
Internet privacy legislation, Congress delegated the responsibility
359
Unfortunately,
for protecting our Internet privacy to the FTC.
the FTC is unable to devote sufficient resources to fully address the

353. Id. at 327.
354. Id. at 328–29.
355. Id. at 329.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 330.
359. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1306, 15 U.S.C. § 6505
(2006); Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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360

issue. A few states have enacted statutes that may more effectively
protect their citizens but the landscape formed by these
enactments is uneven and replete with gaps, as the protections
provided by each state (if they provide any protections at all) are
361
different.
Congress’ enactment of omnibus Internet privacy legislation
would provide a consistent standard for Internet privacy. To avoid
over-burdening the FTC or any other governmental body, Congress
should leave the enforcement of its new Internet privacy law to
private citizens.
This concept is not new. Congress has long empowered
private individuals to bring suit to “vindicate important public
362
policy goals.”
The idea behind this “private attorney general”
concept is fairly simple, consisting “essentially of providing a cause
of action for individuals who have been injured by the conduct
Congress wishes to proscribe, usually with the additional incentive
363
of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff.”
This concept has
been used to address a variety of societal concerns, such as civil
364
365
366
rights, environmental protection, securities fraud, and the
367
improper payment of Medicare funds.

360. See Cody, supra note 198, at 1228.
361. See supra Part I.C.
362. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
183, 186 (2003) (discussing the concept of the “private attorney general”).
363. Id.
364. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2006) (creating a
private right of action to enforce public accommodation laws); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968).
365. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006)
(providing that “any citizen” may bring suit against any individual or company
causing water pollution).
366. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). The
courts have found an implied private cause of action in this section. See, e.g.,
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (D.C. Pa. 1946) (using tort law
principles to provide the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action); see also Sean G.
Blackman, Note and Comment, An Analysis of Aider and Abettor Liability Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1323 (1995) (discussing the
development of the private right of action under section 10(b)).
367. Social Security Act § 1862, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (“[Providing a
private cause of action to recover damages] in the case of a primary plan which
fails to provide primary payment (or appropriate reimbursement) in accordance
with paragraphs (1) and (2)(A).”).
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In formulating a federal Internet privacy statute, Congress
should be guided by the FTC’s adoption of the core principles of
fair information practices: Notice, Choice, Access, Security, and
368
Enforcement.
Though these concepts are a reasonable starting
place for our new statute, the first two are really the most
important. In a free market economy, it seems that a website user
who is fully and accurately notified of what personally identifying
information a website collects, stores, and discloses; how, and for
what purpose, such information is used; how such information is
stored and protected; and to whom such information is going to be
disclosed can make an educated choice about what, if any,
information to reveal to the website. Like the statutes in California
and Connecticut, our new federal Internet privacy law should
369
require each
website operator to clearly and conspicuously
370
display a privacy policy that accurately notifies users of:
• what personally identifying information is collected, stored,
or disclosed by the website;
• how, and for what purpose, such information is used by the
website;
• how such information is stored and protected by the website;
and
• to whom such information will or may be disclosed.
Each website should be required to handle personally identifying
information only in accordance with its published privacy policy
and should be prohibited from making false or misleading
statements in such a policy.
Whenever the terms of a website’s privacy policy materially
change, each user of the site should be given the opportunity to
371
“opt-out”
and require that the website handle his or her
personally identifying information in accordance with the privacy
368. Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov
/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited June 30, 2011).
369. Requiring each website to display a privacy policy, as opposed to merely
prohibiting sites from making false or misleading statements in such policies, will
eliminate the disincentive for companies to adopt such policies posed by the laws
in Nebraska and Pennsylvania. See supra Part II.C.
370. To ensure that users are given the opportunity to review the privacy
policy, the law should require that a link to the policy be placed on the homepage
of the website and each page which requests information from the user.
371. Our new federal statute would not require express “opt-in” consent to
collect even sensitive information about an individual, thereby avoiding the
concerns raised by industry groups about the draft Best Practices Act released by
Representatives Boucher and Stearns. See supra Part II.B.3.
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policy in effect at the time that the user revealed his or her
information to the website. It seems only reasonable that the
website operator who told his or her users that it would handle
their information in a certain way before being given that
information must not be permitted to enact an ex post facto policy
change that may subject the users to risks they would not have
voluntarily assumed.
Our new federal statute should proscribe minimum standards
for a website’s privacy practices and not preempt more protective
372
state laws.
It must provide for a private cause of action for any
person whose information has been handled by a website in a way
that is materially inconsistent with the terms of that website’s
privacy policy or who has been harmed by relying upon a materially
false or misleading statement set forth in such a policy.
Due to the difficulty in proving actual damages in Internet
privacy cases, the new statute should provide for statutory damages,
373
without proof of actual damages.
To encourage private citizens
to bring suit to enforce their rights, and encourage competent
attorneys to take on such suits, the new statute must require a court
to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevails in
374
such an action.

372. Thereby avoiding a primary objection, expressed by consumer groups, to
the draft Best Practices Act released by Representatives Boucher and Stearns. See
supra Part II.B.3.
373. Congress regularly provides for statutory damages where actual damages
would be difficult to prove. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts,
Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952) (“[Statutory damages are intended to allow] the
owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done to him, in a case where the
rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits”
(quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935))); Murray v. GMAC
Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that statutory damages
allow for the recovery of modest damages that are likely small and difficult to
quantify, without proof of actual injury); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading,
Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Statutory damages are awarded when no
actual damages are proven or they are difficult to calculate.”).
374. Karlan, supra note 362, at 205 (“Attorney’s fees are the fuel that drives the
private attorney general engine.”). The underlying policy behind awarding
attorney’s fees is that it will encourage private individuals to bring the suit or
encourage legal services organizations to bring such suits when the litigants
themselves cannot afford to finance the litigation. See id. at 205–06; see also
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing
attorney’s fees in the context of the “private attorney general” doctrine).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

55

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12

1726

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:4

VI. CONCLUSION
Our existing federal Internet privacy protections are
insufficient. Congress has delegated the job of addressing our
Internet privacy concerns to the FTC, and the FTC is unable to
shoulder the entire burden. Only by spreading the burden
amongst private citizens can the Internet privacy issue be fully
addressed.
Congress should follow the lead of other nations in
establishing an omnibus Internet privacy law that balances the
needs of Internet users against those of the Internet businesses that
drive the e-commerce economy. At a minimum, each website
should be required to clearly and accurately inform its users of
what personally identifying information it collects and how that
information is used, stored, and disclosed. Armed with that
knowledge, Internet users will be empowered to choose whether to
reveal personally identifying information to websites that may
disclose such information to third parties or use the information to
generate revenue. By establishing appropriate minimum standards
for Internet privacy, without diluting existing state law protections,
and empowering individuals to enforce those standards by bringing
suit, Congress will enhance our Internet privacy without placing an
additional burden on the FTC or other government agencies.
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